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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900059-CA 
v. : 
ROBERT E. HORNER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from convictions of two counts of 
unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented on appeal are: 
1. Does the evidence establish that defendant was 
entrapped as a matter of law? 
When presented with an entrapment claim, a reviewing 
court will affirm a conviction unless the evidence, viewed in the 
light most favorable to the jury verdict, leaves no reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of law. State 
v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986). 
2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of 
counsel at trial based solely on the disbarment of his attorney 
after defendant's trial? 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
generally presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. 
Tempiin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). However, when as here 
the issue is presented for the first time on appeal, without an 
evidentiary hearing having been conducted below, the 
ineffectiveness claim presents a question of law reviewed on the 
record of the underlying trial. See State v. Humphries, 818 P.2d 
1027 (Utah 1991). A defendant must show both that counsel 
rendered deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and 
that a reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's 
deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been 
different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, 
statutes, or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues 
presented on appeal is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with two counts of unlawful 
distribution of a controlled substance (cocaine), or agreeing, 
consenting, or arranging to distribute a controlled substance 
(cocaine), a second degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988) (R. 10-12). 
Before trial, defendant moved the trial court to 
determine whether he was entrapped as a matter of fact and law 
2 
(R. 36). The court, concluding that it could not find entrapment 
as a matter of law, ruled that defendant would have to present 
the issue to the jury (Transcr. of Nov. 30, 1989 hearing at 98; 
R. 48). 
A jury convicted defendant of both counts, implicitly 
rejecting his entrapment defense (R. 103-104). The trial court 
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
at the Utah State Prison on both counts, fined him a total of 
$10,000 plus a 25% surcharge, and ordered him to pay $1,060 in 
restitution (R. 121-22). However, the court stayed execution of 
the prison sentence and placed defendant on thirty-six months' 
probation (id,.). 
Defendant's trial counsel filed an appeal but failed to 
file a brief. This resulted in dismissal of the appeal (R. 143). 
However, this Court granted defendant's motion to reinstate his 
appeal, which is now before the Court on defendant's pro se 
brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A statement of facts beyond that which appears above in 
the Statement of the Case is not necessary to the resolution of 
the issues presented on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant's failure to provide this Court with a trial 
transcript precludes consideration of his claims that he was 
entrapped as a matter of law and that the evidence is 
insufficient to prove he had the requisite criminal intent. 
3 
To prevail on either claim, defendant must marshal all 
the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and then show how this 
marshalled evidence is insufficient to support the verdict even 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Also, 
the rules of appellate procedure require that defendant support 
all factual assertions in his brief with references to the 
record. He fails to satisfy either of these requirements due to 
the absence of a trial transcript. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
lacks merit. He neither identifies deficient performance by his 
trial counsel nor demonstrates any prejudice flowing therefrom. 
Furthermore, he does not establish a factual basis upon which 
this Court could find a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment; 
the mere fact that trial counsel was disbarred after defendant's 
trial does not constitute per se ineffective assistance. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHES THAT HE WAS ENTRAPPED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW OR THAT THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO PROVE CRIMINAL INTENT 
Under the heading "Entrapment," defendant argues both 
that he was entrapped as a matter of law and that the evidence is 
insufficient to prove he acted with the requisite criminal 
intent. Br. of Appellant at 6-11. His argument fails in both 
respects. 
A. Standard of Review 
As noted above, prior to trial defendant moved the 
trial court to determine the entrapment question (R. 36). See 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1990). After hearing evidence, the 
court concluded that it could not find entrapment as a matter of 
law and ruled that defendant would have to present the issue to 
the jury (Transcr. of Nov. 30, 1989 hearing at 98; R. 48). At 
trial, defendant presented an entrapment defense (see Jury 
Instructions Nos. 11 and 12 (R. 89-90)), which the jury 
implicitly rejected when it convicted him. Under these 
circumstances, defendant's entrapment argument on appeal is 
considered a challenge to the jury verdict, even though he argues 
that he was entrapped "as a matter of law." See, e.g., State v. 
Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 499, 501 (Utah 1989); State v. Martin, 713 
P.2d 60, 61 (Utah 1986). 
When presented with an insufficient evidence claim, an 
appellate court "'review[s] the evidence and all inferences which 
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to 
the verdict'" and will reverse a jury conviction "'only when the 
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which 
he was convicted.'" State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 
1992) (quoting State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985)). 
Furthermore, when challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence, the "defendant must 'marshal all evidence supporting 
the jury's verdict and must then show how this marshaled evidence 
is insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict.'" State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 
470, 472 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
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1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991)). 
When reviewing an entrapment claim, an appellate court 
will affirm the conviction unless the evidence leaves no 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was entrapped as a matter of 
law. State v. Udell, 728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986). 
B• Entrapment 
Defendant has not provided this Court with a trial 
transcript. The appellate record contains only a transcript of 
the pretrial entrapment hearing. Thus, in challenging the jury's 
verdict and its implicit rejection of his entrapment defense, 
defendant does not satisfy the marshalling requirement or 
referred to the record as required by rule 24(e), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, see Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (Utah App. 1987) ("'This Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or supported by, the 
record.'" (quoting Uckerman v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 
P.2d 142, 144 (Utah 1978)). At bottom, defendant's failure to 
provide a trial transcript on appeal precludes consideration of 
his claim that the evidence demonstrates entrapment as a matter 
of law. State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985) 
(defendant's failure to provide trial transcript on appeal 
precluded consideration of his claim of error).1 
1
 Defendant's failure to provide a trial transcript on 
appeal illustrates one of the hazards of pursuing an appeal 
without counsel, as defendant has chosen to do here. He 
obviously is not aware of the applicable standards of review, the 
requirements of the rules of appellate procedure, or the 
importance of providing a complete record on appeal. 
Although the record contains correspondence between 
defendant and the court reporter which refers to trial 
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C. Sufficiency of Evidence on Intent 
Defendant's failure to provide a trial transcript on 
appeal also precludes consideration of his argument that the 
evidence is insufficient to prove he had the requisite criminal 
intent. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT HE WAS DENIED 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result would have been different. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 
886, 893 (Utah 1986). A "[defendant must prove that specific, 
identified acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance. The claim may not be 
speculative, but must be a demonstrative reality[.]M State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam). Here, 
defendant fails to meet either prong of the Strickland standard. 
Without identifying any specific acts or omissions of 
trial counsel that would constitute deficient performance, or 
alleging prejudice from any deficient performance, defendant 
argues that he received per se ineffective assistance because his 
transcripts (R. 183-84), there is no indication that defendant 
made any effort to comply with the transcript filing requirements 
of rule 11, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This Court fully 
advised him of those requirements in a letter dated April 20, 
1992 (R. 187-88). 
-7-
counsel was disbarred after defendant's trial. Defendant does 
not disclose, and it appears he does not know, the reason for 
counsel's disbarment. See Br. of Appellant at 13 ("Whatever this 
attorney was doing during the latter half of 1989, it led to his 
dis-barmen [sic] . . . . ) . 
Defendant cites a panel decision of the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, Bellamy v. Cocrdell, 952 F.2d 626 (2nd Cir.), 
vacated on reh'q, 974 F.2d 302 (2nd Cir. 1992) (en banc), as 
authority for application of a per se rule. He fails to note or 
discuss the en banc Second Circuit opinion which vacated the 
panel opinion and concluded that, under the facts of the case, 
the per se rule did not apply. See Bellamy v. Coqdell, 974 F.2d 
302 (2nd Cir. 1992) (en banc). However, even if this Court were 
to accept the rejected analysis of the panel decision in Bellamy, 
the facts of that case, as outlined by the panel, are clearly 
distinguishable.2 
There, defense counsel was charged with professional 
misconduct prior to Bellamy's trial for murder and criminal 
possession of a weapon. 952 F.2d at 627. In answering the 
charges, counsel implicitly admitted that due to physical and 
mental difficulties he was incapable of practicing law. JCd. at 
628. Nevertheless, having promised the disciplinary committee 
that he would not go to trial without the assistance of another 
attorney, counsel proceeded alone to represent Bellamy at trial 
without disclosing the misconduct charges or his admitted 
2
 A strong dissent, which adopted the panel's analysis, was 
filed in the en banc decision. Bellamy, 974 F.2d at 309-13* 
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incapacity to his client. Ibid. Shortly after being convicted, 
Bellamy learned of his counsel's problems — which then included 
an indefinite suspension as an attorney based on counsel's 
incapacity to practice law — and sought relief from both his 
conviction and sentence on the ground that he had been denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial. Ibid. Ultimately, the 
Second Circuit panel granted Bellamy a writ of habeas corpus, 
holding that his case was within a small class of cases where the 
Strickland two-pronged test does not apply and ineffective 
assistance is presumed. .Id. at 631. 
Following the analysis in several prior Second Circuit 
cases, the panel reasoned that the facts of Bellamy's case 
constituted a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel because "the defect which led to [counsel's] suspension 
was 'a serious substantive flaw, [such as] . . . a demonstrated 
inability to meet the threshold criteria of competence in the 
law.'" Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 
888 (2nd Cir. 1990)) (second alteration in original). The panel 
said: 
Had [counsel] been suspended solely for the 
financial charges originally brought against 
him, . . . we might well have upheld 
Bellamy's conviction. But when an attorney 
is admittedly incapable of preparing for a 
hearing to be held a week or two before a 
criminal trial, when that incapacity is the 
ground for suspension from practice shortly 
after the trial, when that suspension would 
almost certainly have occurred prior to the 
criminal trial but for an unfulfilled promise 
to be assisted by competent counsel during 
the trial, and when the attorney's client is 
ignorant of all of this, we feel obligated by 
our cases to hold on such unusual facts that 
the client has been denied the effective 
-9-
assistance of counsel guaranteed a defendant 
by the Constitution. 
Ibid. (Of course, the en banc decision rejected this reasoning.) 
Defendant makes no claim that during trial his attorney 
had a disabling condition like that present in Bellamy. Nor does 
he claim there was a "serious substantive flaw" similar to that 
present in other Second Circuit cases, relied on by the panel in 
Bellamy, where a per se Sixth Amendment violation was found: 
United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2nd Cir. 1990) (defense 
counsel, although licensed to practice law during defendant's 
trial, had fraudulently obtained his license); United States v. 
Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867 (2nd Cir. 1984) (defense counsel, unknown 
to defendant, participated in criminal conduct related to the 
conduct for which defendant was convicted; this conflict of 
interest denied defendant his right to counsel at trial); Solina 
v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2nd Cir. 1983) (defense counsel 
was unlicensed and lack of license was based on failure to seek 
license or denial for reason going to legal ability). 
Indeed, defendant's case may be similar to two cases 
the Bellamy panel distinguished. In Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 
F.2d 375 (2nd Cir. 1988), the court refused to find a per se 
Sixth Amendment violation where counsel was disbarred after 
representing the defendant at a hearing to determine whether the 
defendant's confession was voluntary. The attorney was disbarred 
for misappropriating client funds and for failing to represent 
clients after accepting fees. 848 F.2d at 378. As the Bellamy 
panel noted, M[N]either of these bases of disbarment called into 
question the attorney's competence to practice law at the time he 
-10-
was representing Waterhouse. . . . It was therefore not 
considered pertinent to the defendant's representation at the 
confession hearing that his attorney was disbarred." 952 F.2d at 
631. 
Likewise, the Second Circuit refused to find a per se 
Sixth Amendment violation in United States v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 
528 (2nd Cir. 1990), where defense counsel "was under 
investigation by the Organized Crime Strike Force for the Eastern 
District of New York before and during the proceedings against 
the defendant." Bellamy, 952 F.2d at 631. "[A]s in Waterhouse, 
'[the attorney's] purported crimes were totally unrelated to the 
crimes for which [the defendant] was being tried'[;] [t]here was 
similarly no evidence that the attorney was incompetent to 
practice law." Ibid, (quoting Waterhouse, 900 F.2d at 531) 
(first alteration added). 
Without identifying the basis for his attorney's 
disbarment, defendant is unable to avail himself of the Bellamy 
panel's holding. Contrary to the facts of Bellamy, defendant's 
situation may be like that of the defendants in Waterhouse and 
Aiello, where there was no Sixth Amendment violation. Defendant 
simply fails to carry his burden of showing that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel at trial based solely on the 
post-trial disbarment of his attorney. As the en banc decision 
in Bellamy makes clear, the per se rule is applied in very 
limited circumstances and "'without enthusiasm.'" 974 F.2d at 
306 (quoting Aiello, 900 F.2d at 532). 
Finally, defendant also alleges that his counsel (1) 
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promised him that the "case was 'in the bag' because the [trial 
judge] was [counsel's] former law partner," and (2) during trial 
discussed with the prosecutor possible employment as counsel for 
"the Special Drug Task Force." Br. of Appellant at 14. Insofar 
as defendant intends for these allegations to form the basis of 
an ineffectiveness claim, they are not supported by any record 
evidence and therefore cannot be considered. See State v. Jones, 
823 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Utah 1991) (because nothing in the record 
supported defendant's claim of a Miranda violation, defendant had 
failed to carry his burden of establishing ineffective assistance 
of counsel); State v. Colonna, 766 P.2d 1062, 1068 (Utah 1988) 
("Defendant may not prevail on ineffectiveness claims where he 
has raised only the possibility of ineffective assistance of 
counsel but failed to offer evidence thereon."); State v. Hovt, 
806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991) ("The record before us is 
inadequate to resolve defendant's claim that counsel failed to 
object to certain evidence . • • . " ) . See also State v. Bingham, 
684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984) ("This Court will not rule on matters 
outside the trial court record."). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's convictions. A 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 3 day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID B. THOMPSON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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